Attributed mainly to Groucho Marx, the quote: “Why should I care for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me?” has turned into quite a philosophical debate. The two little questions, if read merely on the surface, make a lot of sense. Why should it matter to me what happens to the universe and its inhabitants long after I am no longer here to experience any of it, especially when those people can’t affect me in any way? Yet, the more I think about it, the more I am convinced I want to care for posterity, not because of what it has done for me but for what it has the potential to do for me (and my values).
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What is Posterity?
Before I explicitly explain why I care about posterity, I’d like to elaborate on what I mean by posterity.
During an average lifespan of a person, there is a strong possibility of meeting the immediate descendants, then, a weaker chance of grandchildren, and finally the weakest, of the three possibilities, of great-grandchildren. Anything beyond that might be a miracle or maybe a case of young marriages consecutively for three generations.
Since there is a high chance of meeting these future generations, feeling strongly for their welfare, and even benefiting from their existence, let’s exclude them from our definition of posterity. After all, we have the second part of our topic to justify, and so we can’t talk about the people who may
affect us directly. Thus, I will only consider the (possible) generations after these descendants 1,2.
Why Care for Posterity?
The literature is filled with different reasons to care about posterity. Some of the most common
arguments in the posterity’s favor stem from ethical/moral obligations 3 , inter generational justice 4 , environmental concerns 5 , and more recently longtermism 6 .
A prevailing view 7 is that bearing responsibility towards future generations is an obligation on us. It makes even more sense in light of our various activities in damaging the environment, making the world less inhabitable for future generations. Since it is our actions (nuclear experiments, creating pollutants, depleting non-renewable resources, etc.) that have robbed the posterity of its birth rights, it is even more incumbent upon us to work or even make sacrifices for its well-being.
While this may be the decent thing to do, I don’t think it is realistic. Most people may not be able to feign complete indifference to the future generation but at the same time, it would be counter-intuitive for them to give posterity precedence over their own interests. One way it may appeal to some is if people believe they are doing it to be better people so indirectly they do it for themselves.
As Nicholas Rescher said:
“This sort of reflexive obligation to make ourselves into good people is at issue with our future generations. The obligations involved here are not so much duties we owe to them as duties we owe to ourselves.
… What is at issue here is an ethical responsibility that issues from the larger metaphysical obligation to make ourselves into good people.” 8
His point is that we have an obligation to be better humans for the world to become a better place.
A related argument would be ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’; here the people in question may be from different generations, but the underlying virtue still holds.
While I agree that caring for posterity would be the right thing to do ‘for ourselves’, I don’t buy the ‘to be better people’ part. There is an asymmetry here in the direction of the time that gives us the freedom to not care about being good people to the future generation. It comes down to what we believe to be a good person. So when it is not affecting the current generation, it would make sense to work for the future generation. But what if making a decision to help the future people comes at the stake of depriving the present people of something essential? In case of such a conflict, who should we prioritize for us to be ‘good people’? My answer would be: those who are present!
Using the same argument, we can eliminate most of the reasons to care for posterity. Yet, I claim that we should care for posterity and my reason is also selfish. I think we need posterity for the sake of every or anything we value, even if we won’t be there to experience it. I will explain it in detail in the next section.
Preservation of Values
Rescher 9 argues that we cannot control or predict future generations and so this means that we don’t get anything out of them — in terms of carrying out our values.
“As any parent soon comes to recognize, control over our posterity is very limited. And even merely cognitive control — information — is problematic issue. We humans do not have a good track record when it comes to predicting the course of human affairs.” 10
This example of parents not being able to control their children holds because parents are more invested in the well-being of their immediate children. But I don’t think it applies to posterity. This need to control vanishes because we don’t know them, thereby unable to invest in their lives either.
Then he says:
“…there is very little we can confidently say about their [posterity’s] knowledge, their values, and their life situations, and indeed even about their scientific understanding of the physical universe that we share with time.” 11
I think this unpredictability of posterity is the real beauty of the situation as it allows possibilities in all directions. His underlying argument here is the ultimate change, which being a process philosopher he embraces and thus believes that the dynamic nature of things takes the control away from us. But I would like to differ. While I accept the change and unpredictability of things, the lack of control seems to me a good thing as it allows room for progress and evolution.
Finally, there is the matter of size too. With a dozen children and grandchildren, you might miss the opportunity to further your values, but posterity is indefinite (i.e., if it survives) and hence offers more chances for our values to survive.
Looking at the world, I accept that humans are flawed, e.g Kant is a huge influence over the entire philosophy — almost akin to Shakespeare’s influence on Literature or Einstein’s contribution to Science. The greatness of his work on moral philosophy is undeniable and philosophers have built so much on it. Yet, he often belittled women in his works 12,13 since men were considered superior to women at that time. Ethical matters like gender equality are however taken to be common sense nowadays. So I agree with Rescher that values change but unlike him, I believe it to be a good thing.
The same goes for Science and Arts. I might be attached to a particular piece of fiction and would like it to stay forever, but it is quite possible a superior work has been written, replacing it in history, and to me individually, it might be displeasing but collectively speaking, some form of Arts would stay and be delivered to the future generations. Similarly, Science — in the form of progress, and even Morality — refined over centuries would reach the people in the future, to be refined even further.
This is not mere speculation, it is history. So, while it is true we can’t see the future, we can judge it to some extent by looking at the past. History is diverse too and despite the losses, a lot has been preserved, including the values — the cycle may continue!
An Obligation or Not?
It is true that there can be extinction or loss of values altogether but what is the probability of it?
Should we stop caring for posterity because it might ultimately go extinct or evolve into different species? I think not! Besides, posterity is our only chance at living on. Immorality, diseases, and misfortunes have occurred in the past. Germany survived the Holocaust and built herself with better moral values — so who is to say our posterity won’t also emerge successful or better? It only makes sense for us to do our best and leave something for the future generation so they can have enough resources to go on with. However, it is of course not an obligation, and building the future at the cost of the present is not intended. But purely out of self-interest, either to have a shot at our values living on or merely out of curiosity for this adventure of existence to continue, we must care for posterity — even if it hasn’t done anything for us yet, it is through it that we have a chance to live on when we are no longer physically alive.
Originally published on Medium
References:
1. My classification is heavily bought from Nicholas Rescher’s Distant Posterity: A Philosophical Glance Along Time’s Corridor, except that I am not further classifying the posterity into distant, remote, very remote, or astronomical.
2. Rescher, Nicholas. “Distant Posterity: A Philosophical Glance along Time’s Corridor.” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 72, no. 1, Sept. 2018, pp. 3–27, 10.1353/rvm.2018.0007. Accessed 6 July 2022.
3. Bickham, Stephen. “Future Generations and Contemporary Ethical Theory.” The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 15, no. 2, 1981, pp. 169–177, Accessed 7 May 2020.
4. Beckerman, Wilfred, and Joanna Pasek. “Intergenerational Equity.” Justice, Posterity, and the Environment, by Wilfred
Beckerman and Joanna Pasek, Oxford University Press, May 2001.
5. Avner De-Shalit. Why Posterity Matters. Taylor & Francis, 1995.
6. MacAskill, William. “The Case for Longtermism.” New York Times, 5 Aug. 2022, www.nytimes.com/2022/08/05/opinion/the-case-for-longtermism.html.
7. Avner De-Shalit. Why Posterity Matters. Taylor & Francis, 1995.
8. Rescher, pp. 21
9. Rescher, Nicholas. “Distant Posterity: A Philosophical Glance along Time’s Corridor.” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 72, no. 1, Sept. 2018, pp. 3–27, 10.1353/rvm.2018.0007. Accessed 6 July 2022.
10. Ibid., pp. 13
11. Ibid., pp. 14
12. Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Anthropology. Cambridge University Press, 20 Dec. 2012
13. Immanuel Kant, and John T Goldthwait. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. Berkeley, Calif. ; London, University Of California Press, 2004.
Icklings 